A Tale of Two Ethnicities?
An Analysis of Approaches to ‘Ethnic Conflict’: The Case of Kosovo.

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Abstract

This dissertation is an analysis of approaches to ‘ethnic conflict’, using Kosovo as a case study. It begins with an analysis of two competing approaches that diverge from the objectivist basis of traditional security studies. The approaches to the study of world politics ofWaever, Buzan et al (the Copenhagen School) and David Campbell are applied to the case of Kosovo, with a focus on their theorization of identity and ethnicity. The starting premise is that the Copenhagen School approach operates with an untenable, petrified conception of identity, whilst Campbell overestimates the fluidity of identity. The contributions and limitations of each are explored, and the two approaches are supplemented with elements of the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. This allows for an exploration of the resonance of ethnicity in Kosovo without asserting a static, essentialized conception of identity. The emergence of violent conflict is then explored on the basis of Arjun Appadurai’s “hypothesis of treachery”, so as to account for the transition from a low-level ethnicization of everyday practice to violence. The context of such analysis is a contestation of dominant representations of Kosovo, and of ‘ethnic conflict’ more generally. The liberal focus on Milosevic and elite manipulation of popular sentiment is common to analysis of Kosovo, as is the realist characterisation of the outbreak of suppressed hatreds at the end of the Cold War. Both types of account construct ‘Kosovo’ and ‘the Balkans’ as the backward or uncivilized Other of ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’, a discursive construction pivotal to policies taken in relation to the region. What is therefore needed is an approach that can

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explain practices without essentializing identities and othering the protagonists, whilst avoiding cultural relativism. This dissertation is thus a critical reflection on how conflict in Kosovo is analysed.

Introduction

This dissertation is prompted by the inadequacy of current approaches to 'ethnic conflict' in academic and policy circles. Kosovo is frequently characterised as an example of the post-Cold War trend of ethnic conflict, characterisations of which take one of several broad forms. For example: realist accounts tend to focus on the end of Communist rule lifting the lid on old nationalist antagonisms. Alternatively, in liberal accounts, conflict is generally attributed to political entrepreneurs such as Milosevic, who mobilised latent nationalistic feelings in the political vacuum following the death of Tito. However, such approaches fail to account for their object of analysis: 'ethnic groups'. In this, they take identities as given, assuming an objective, observable reality, ignoring the importance of processes of interpretation. They ignore issues of the internal cohesion of states and fail to account for the resonance of ethnicity as a social signifier.

This dissertation begins with an application of the approaches of Waever, Buzan et al (the Copenhagen School) and of David Campbell to the case of Kosovo. These approaches were chosen because they depart from a traditional neorealist security studies approach, and the focus is on the question of how they theorize identity in 'ethnic conflict'. The basic assumption is that, whilst the idea of Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo is not false, the way it works needs to be explored more carefully: ethnic difference does not in itself lead to (violent) conflict. In contrast to the assumption of the Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo as proto-states engaged in a battle for survival in an anarchic arena, it is useful to see Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, and the conflict between them, as mutually constituted. This constructivist view asks questions about how identities, interests and insecurities are created, rather than taking them for granted. The claim of social construction is a double one: firstly, that "the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material"; and secondly, that "these structures shape actors’ identities and interests,

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2 This view is espoused by Robert Kaplan in a text widely cited in policy circles, including by US President Clinton (Woodward, 1995:426n). Kaplan refers to the Balkans as “a confused, often violent ethnic cauldron” and to the “psychologically closed, tribal nature of the Serbs, Croats, and others” (Kaplan, 1994:xi-xii, 16). In 1990-1991 the journal International Security (volume 15) was replete with references to the risks of the revival of ethnic hatred following the end of the Cold War. For example: “Nationalism has been contained during the Cold War, but it is likely to reemerge” (Mearsheimer, 1990:55-56); the Cold War “tended to dampen” but “did not entirely eliminate” tensions and conflicts in Eastern Europe (Larrabee, 1990:58).

3 For example: “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites” and is “the result of purposeful and strategic policies rather than irrational acts of the masses” (Gagnon, 1994:132, 164).
rather than just their behavior” (Wendt, 1995:71-71). The Copenhagen School authors and David Campbell can be described as critical theorists, although the former take a constructivist approach in contrast to the latter’s post-structuralist approach. Despite their differences, they would broadly agree with Wendt’s claim about the construction of international politics.

The dissertation begins with the approach of the Copenhagen School, who take a constructivist approach to threat creation and referent objects yet aim to remain within the boundaries of traditional security studies (Buzan et al, 1998:4, 207). The work of the Copenhagen School centres on the pairing of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, with a view to broadening the security studies agenda whilst maintaining its coherence and relevance. In this dissertation both the 1993 text Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (Waever et al), and the 1998 text Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan et al) will be used. The former introduces the concept of societal security to provide an alternative focus to the state as referent object for security, and the latter introduces the concept of securitization, so as to emphasise the intersubjective creation of threats. Their approach has been called a "theoretical reconstruction" of neorealism, a potential replacement for the "control strategy" of much recent neorealist scholarship in the attempt to maintain the relevance of the paradigm in the post-Cold War era (Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996). Neumann calls their approach "a shift in writing practice that is of key importance to the application of collective identity theorizing to international relations": their focus on "the clash of different discursive practices" is what undergirds the concept of societal security (Neumann, 1999:31). The concepts of societal security and securitization can be seen as part of an attempt to ground conceptions of actors in their social and historical background, to overcome the abstract individualism and objective empiricism of neorealism.

This approach will be contrasted to that of David Campbell. Drawing on National Deconstruction. Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, a post-structuralist approach to identity will be applied to further highlight the criticism levied at the Copenhagen School authors that they operate with an untenable, petrified conception of identity. Campbell’s post-structuralist approach conceives identity as constituted in relation to difference, with the possibility of difference being turned into otherness and acted aggressively against. Identity is never fully fixed or given, it can only be partially fixed; it thus needs constant reinscription. In relation to Kosovo, this approach contests the ‘ethnic conflict’ characterisation and in denaturalizing it, reveals resistance to a hegemonic politics that has been silenced rather than absent. However, the criticism to
be aimed at Campbell is that he would find far fewer sites of resistance in Kosovo to ethnicized politics than he did in Bosnia, and that the emergence of conflict along ethnic lines must be explored more fully. As such, both Campbell and the Copenhagen School's approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Campbell overestimates the fluidity of identities in practical terms in Kosovo, whilst Waever et al work with an excessively static conception of identity. The problem of navigating a path between the two approaches can be overcome by referring to the work of Pierre Bourdieu. The concepts of habitus and fields will be explored with the aim of investigating the emergence of violent conflict in Kosovo, taking elements of both Campbell and Waever et al's approaches seriously. On this basis, and using the work of Arjun Appadurai, the emergence of violence in the name of ethnicity can be explored in a more nuanced way than attributing it to either ancient ethnic hatreds or political manipulation.

This sort of analysis is important because seemingly neutral descriptions have political consequences. How conflict in Kosovo is described is thus of crucial significance. Neither the realist nor the liberal characterisation takes account of the idea that there may be issues of identity and types of rights provisions at stake. The effect of these descriptions is pivotal to the course of world politics as they make certain courses of action necessary and others unthinkable. The realist characterisation of ancient hatreds casts Kosovars as pre-modern and irrational, in contrast to the enlightened West, which has to deal with the problems thrown up for world politics by such actors. Even when not constructed in such primordialist terms, realist accounts work on the basis of prior, unstated assumptions concerning identity. The assumption of actors with pre-given and unchanging identities establishes Kosovo as a situation of conflict, leaving no room for analysis of how this may have become so, and ignoring alternative assumptions about identity that may have resonated in Kosovo. The liberal characterisation of manipulative state leaders heading 'rogue states' posits states such as Serbia in a subordinate position in relation to the so-called international community, accused of violating the norms of civilized behaviour. The idea of mass murder and destruction as a "statist" phenomenon, with a focus on Milosevic, presents a top-down, cohesive image of states that writes out or fails adequately to theorize the activity of non-elite or non-state actors (Mann, 2000). Liberal approaches also promote the idea of "civil society" as the best guarantee of democracy and peace, but this is problematic as "civil society" is not by definition "progressive" (Mann, 2000). These issues are highly relevant to Kosovo and help crystallize the research issues at stake: how to explain conflict in Kosovo without resorting to essentialist conceptions of identity and othering the protagonists. As Doty (1996:28) explains, discourses at play in a particular case exemplify the representational practices at work more widely in
constructing subjects and their others. So the representation of Kosovo in Western academic and policy circles is important in terms of the ostensible surge in 'ethnic conflict' after the end of the Cold War: how the West constructs Kosovo, and cases of 'ethnic conflict' more generally affects the policies taken in response.

The concept of ethnicity is crucial in this respect. Much theorization of ethnicity remains within the bounds of the primordialist-instrumentalist debate: the debate over whether ethnicity is a pre-given characteristic acquired by birth, “which the participants ... see as exterior, coercive, and 'given’”, or a “social, political, and cultural resource for different interest- and status-groups” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:8)\(^5\).

The approach taken here is an interpretive one that conceives ethnicity as a means of organising social difference, in line with Barth’s assessment that “[i]t is not the cultural content enclosed by the boundary, but the boundary itself and the symbolic 'border guards’ (language, dress, food, etc.) that perpetuate the community” (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996:9). The implication is that ethnicity cannot be taken as an independent variable in the analysis of conflict in Kosovo. The question becomes one of how ethnicity was constructed in Kosovo so as to become the basis for violence. This returns to the point that the characterisation of Kosovo as a case of 'ethnic conflict' may not be wrong, but that the explanation for the emergence of conflict needs to be different. How conflict is characterised is of crucial importance to the strategies that are designed to respond to it. This dissertation aims to apply to Kosovo the analyses provided by the Copenhagen School authors and David Campbell as two competing ways of bringing identity more explicitly into international relations theory. It is not concerned with the myriad of theories of nationalism, nor is it an attempt at a definitive account of the emergence of conflict in Kosovo. Rather, elements of two quite recent contributions to international relations theory are analysed, and supplemented with the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, in an attempt to think critically about approaches to the study of 'ethnic conflict’. This is not to suggest that conflict in Kosovo was solely ‘about’ identity, rather that if identity is not adequately theorized, analysis of events in Kosovo will be blind to one of the major aspects of conflict.

The structure of this dissertation is as follows: first, an analysis of the Copenhagen School approach as it relates to the theorization of identities, with a focus on the concepts of societal security and securitization. Then, an exploration of David Campbell’s approach to identity, which contests the Copenhagen School analysis. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu is introduced with a view to overcoming the difficulties posed by setting up Waever, Buzan et al and Campbell in opposition to each other. This allows an exploration of the emergence of conflict in Kosovo that takes account of
the centrality of identity without resorting to essentialist characterisations. On this basis, the emergence of violent conflict in Kosovo can be analysed, via the work of Arjun Appadurai (1996). The concluding section brings this all together and asks about the implications of such an approach.

1. Societal Security and Securitization: the Copenhagen School approach

"Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community" (Buzan et al, 1998:119). This definition continues the broad theme taken up in the 1993 text of security as an issue of survival, and identity as the key factor when it comes to society. In both texts, the nature of society is left theoretically open, but "in the contemporary international system", given "their historical association with the development of the modern state[,] … politically significant ethno-national and religious identities" are the main units of analysis for societal security (Waever et al, 1993:22-23). Thus in Kosovo, the units for analysis are the Serb and Albanian communities. This is not to deny that other (non-national, non-religious) identities are relevant to the construction of society. A societal identity, as opposed to a social group however, must be able to "compete with the territorial state as a political organizing principle" and "reproduce itself independently of the state", and "in specific situations … national identity is usually able to organize the other identities around itself" (Waever et al, 1993:23). The point is that the form of community is open in principle but empirically, national and religious identities prove most powerful.

The 1998 text adds to this an intersubjective element via the concept of securitization. The process of securitization is a “speech act”: "it is the utterance itself that is the act" (Buzan et al, 1998:26). That is, by labelling an issue a security issue, and having it recognised as such, it becomes a security issue. So a successful securitization speech act occurs when a securitizing actor makes a claim of existential threat to the unit on whose behalf s/he is authorized to speak, and gets it accepted by an appropriate audience. This reveals the intersubjective creation of threat. A successful claim allows the implementation of emergency measures to deal with the threat, which then characterises a situation as a security rather than merely a political issue. Thus, what the analyst studies is this process of threat creation and the effects of successful securitizations. The benefits of adopting the concepts of societal security and securitization are that they introduce identity into conflict analysis, allowing the analyst to consider a referent object other than the state, as is presumed in traditional (objectivist) visions of security. This is part of a challenge to the liberal vision of

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security and the state, which presumes state and societal security to be synonymous (Williams, 1998:438). Once the concept of identity is explicitly introduced to conflict analysis, conflict in the former Yugoslavia is more effectively analysed because it helps explore the impetus to many events in a way precluded by neorealist analysis. Kosovo needs to be understood as both a (state) security and (national) identity problem for Serbs, with their actions simultaneously perceived as threatening by Kosovo Albanians.

In Kosovo securitization was achieved by both Milosevic and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). “The field is structured or biased, but no-one conclusively “holds” the power of securitization” (Buzan et al, 1998:31). This shows that although the ability of Milosevic and the KLA to make resonating claims in the name of survival of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo respectively was not natural or inevitable, it is not inexplicable. Milosevic and the Serb authorities used the threat of Albanian irredentism and terrorism to justify repressive state practices relating to all spheres of life. Examples include the state of emergency declared in 1981 following student and worker demonstrations (Malcolm, 1998:335); mass dismissals of Kosovo Albanians from public sector employment (Clark, 2000:74-77); the state takeover of Rilindja publishing house, which housed all of the Albanian-language press, in June 1993 (International Crisis Group, 1998:27). From 1998 there was a Serb police clampdown centred on the Drenica region, following the killing of several Serb policemen, which is widely interpreted as the start of the most intense phase of repression and brutality prior to the NATO bombing campaign (International Crisis Group, 1998:1). And in the mid-1990s the KLA proclaimed its emergence with a spate of killings of Serb policemen who were representative of the existential threat to the Kosovo Albanian community. In both cases, the actors were not free to do exactly as they chose, despite frequent characterisations of the Milosevic regime as authoritarian and of the KLA as a terrorist band: to elevate an issue to the level of security and act on it requires the recognition of the claim by an audience. "[S]ecuritization can never only be imposed" (Buzan et al, 1998:25) and as such, the speech act element of securitization shows that ethnicized claims must have resonated in Kosovo. This is where Buzan et al draw on Pierre Bourdieu, in relation to social power and the speech act, and the facilitating conditions for a securitization claim. However, they do not explore Bourdieu’s approach further, and as such, their preoccupation with securitization and the transition to security practices from political practices is ultimately unsatisfactory, because it freezes identities at a given point in history, whilst it is exactly these identity processes that are so salient in Kosovo.

Although the idea of the intersubjective creation of threats is a theoretical improvement on the 1993 text, the same criticism still applies, namely that whilst
Buzan et al’s conception of security is radically constructivist, their view of society is not (Huysmans, 1998a:493). Their approach is not designed to deny that other social grouping exist within a society or can have political effects, it is to assert that even though identities are socially constructed, there is in Kosovo a stable discursive field centred around Serb-Albanian relations of antagonism, and it is this which forms the background to the claims which securitizing actors such as Milosevic and the KLA successfully made. As Buzan et al say:

"Identities as other social constructions can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with. At specific points, this "inert constructivism" enables modes of analysis very close to objectivist" (Buzan et al, 1998:205).

Thus, it is possible to talk about 'Serbs and Albanians' in Kosovo. In their analysis of the former Yugoslavia (Waever et al, 1993:93-109), Kosovo is described as part of the "southern powder keg" (a problematic image in itself, suggesting flammable identities awaiting ignition), characterised by "historical trauma" between Serbs and Albanians. By the 1980s in Kosovo, as in the rest of Yugoslavia, economic problems meant “it would have been surprising if political radicalism had not emerged; the issue was what kind of radicalism would be predominant”. Given the "latent ethno-national contradictions" resulting from “historical traumas”, conflict in Kosovo was bound to follow ethnornational lines. The contrasts to an objectivist, statist approach characteristic of traditional security studies are: i) emphasis on “historical memories of a nation” rather than historiographers’ assessment of factual accuracy; and ii) the assertion of a non-state referent object. However, use of terms such as “latent” and “powder keg” are problematic. More work needs to be done on exploring the content of societal identities: a more political approach to how traditions and myths function in popular memory is needed. Why is it ethnic identity which has been mobilised in Kosovo as opposed to the other identities theoretically available to people? And how can such a resonance be explained in a manner that avoids an essentialist argument citing the inevitable outbreak of ancient hatreds in the Balkans? The route Buzan et al take is to accept the petrification of identities and explore possibilities of manoeuvring interaction among actors and ameliorating security dilemmas (Buzan et al, 1998:31).

Whilst the concept of societal, as opposed to merely state security is a useful improvement on traditional security studies, this is unsatisfactory in terms of theorization of identity.

The assumption of a petrified socially constructed identity assumes a division between "becoming" and "being" which is untenable from a post-structuralist perspective (Hansen, 1998:50). It suggests that Serb and Albanian identity in Kosovo underwent a phase of "becoming", being socially constructed through discourses of historical
continuity of the two nations, of demographics and so on, but in the late 1990s those identities could be taken as given. This underplays the extent to which identity not only shapes actions but also is itself shaped by action. The example of Kosovo Albanian identity is a good one: both the strategy of non-violent resistance starting in 1990 and the radicalisation of Kosovo Albanians in the mid- to late 1990s need explaining. Maliqi asserts that non-violent resistance was a result of asserting a political Otherness against the Milosevic regime and Kosovo Serbs. This was an attempt to refute the dominant characterisation ascribed to Kosovo Albanians as violent, backward and rapacious and was a surprising change in the dominant self-perception of Kosovo Albanian identity (Maliqi, 1993:332-334). So, although this was not a securitizing move, it had a profound impact on Kosovar politics, facilitating extraordinary measures such as non-violent marches and demonstrations, and the Trepca miners’ strikes (detailed in Clark, 2000). Although these were not emergency measures in the way the Copenhagen School conceive them, they were the basis of mass Kosovo Albanian political action, and the emergence of the KLA is incomprehensible without them. The second transformation, a radicalisation of Kosovo Albanian identity in the mid-1990s, came as a result of frustration with Rugova’s approach, and drew on more aggressive representations of Kosovo Albanian history, which is not the same as saying an old identity re-emerged unchanged.

The securitization of Kosovo Albanian identity by the KLA can only be understood in relation to the dominant trend of Kosovo Albanian politics since 1990, namely non-violent resistance. It can be seen that the stance of non-violent Other gave way to one of violent Other: the pacifistic, victim-like identity was replaced by one drawing more on the kacak (rebel/guerrilla) tradition of Albanian history. This is not to assert that all Kosovo Albanians went from being totally pacifistic to being outright bloodthirsty, but it is to assert a change in the dominant narratives of Kosovo Albanian identity which facilitated action. In this transformed field of practices the KLA had the social capital necessary to make a claim to violence. The content of Kosovo Albanian identity, what it meant to be ‘Kosovo Albanian’, was affected by practices carried out against it by Serb actors and by the practices carried out in its name by Rugova and by the KLA, which suggests that identities are constantly being (re)formulated. It is only by considering identity issues that the emergence of mass non-violent resistance and the emergence of the KLA can be adequately accounted for. Huysmans asserts that the linkage

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6 The Copenhagen School approach sidelines the study of non-securitizing actors, which is problematic. Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) took a politicizing as opposed to securitizing approach to ameliorating the situation of Kosovo Albanians, analysis of which would be precluded by the Copenhagen School mode of study. However, the relationship of politicization to identity practices, and to later securitization efforts in Kosovo is crucial. This is a lacuna in the work of the Copenhagen School more
between processes of securitization and of identification are not ignored by Buzan et al, but downplayed: it "is not really a substantial element of their research" (Huysmans, 1998a:494n). However, this seems to obfuscate much analysis of conflict in Kosovo: it is issues such as transformations in identity in the emergence of conflict that need further theorization if analyses of 'ethnic conflict' are to have analytical and political purchase.

It is instructive to consider Waever et al's approach to the concept of ethnicity, which is touched upon in the 1993 text but ignored in the 1998 text. In an attempt to overcome the primordialist-instrumentalist dichotomy, they assert that "'[n]ational identity' is ... a discursive construction, but yet it has to work on raw material - there has to be a reservoir of myths, stories, old battles and historic figures", which means that the past is "neither determining nor trivial" (Waever et al, 1993:30). Nations require an ethnic element, but ethnic elements do not always get articulated as an ethnic community or nation (Waever et al, 1993:31). Drawing on Anthony Smith, they concur that it is the "diacritical significance" of attributes, their role in marking boundaries, rather than their actual content that matters. In the 1998 text very little mention is made of the theoretical underpinnings of the basis of societal identity: identity is accepted as discursively constructed yet stable. Societal identity is taken to mean "communities with which one identifies", and although this remains a political and personal choice, at certain times, national or ethnic community can 'trump' others in demanding affiliation (Buzan et al, 1998:120). Securitization functions as a means of mobilising this "diacritical significance" for political effect. However, the process through which this identification occurs is not adequately explored. This is problematic in that it not only hides resistance to the hegemonic mode of politics, it also fails to explore the processes by which this hegemonic politics was established. It is as important to study these processes as it is to study the moves that lead to violent conflict, as they form a vital part of the constitution of conflict.

The approach taken by David Campbell in National Deconstruction is more amenable to exploring this, as it is concerned with unsettling dominant conceptions of identity. The initial claim is that he can more fully appreciate that identities are shaped by actions, that identities are more fluid than Buzan et al imply, but that the question of political mobilisability is where his argument flounders. This then requires a fuller analysis of elements of Bourdieu's sociology to interrogate both the Copenhagen School and Campbell’s approaches to identity and conflict.

generally, although there is not space here to explore it further. See Huysmans, 1998b for an exploration of the logic behind the concept of securitization, and its relationship to desecuritization.
2. Contesting the nationalist imaginary: David Campbell

David Campbell's aim in National Deconstruction is to contest dominant problematizations of the Bosnian war, the most prominent of which involves "the ethnicization of the political field" via an "array of historical, statistical, cartographic, and other procedures" (Campbell, 1998:xii). This "nationalist imaginary", which problematized Bosnia as "a place where political identity is fixed in terms of ethnic exclusivity and requires territorial space to match" (Campbell, 1998:157), is inadequate in terms of formulating a response to violence and is also complicit in its emergence. His approach is a useful contrast to that of the Copenhagen School: whilst the latter can be accused of reifying identity, Campbell can be accused of overestimating the fluidity of identity. The aim of this section is to apply Campbell’s approach to Kosovo, focussing on his account of ethnicity and violence, and critically to interrogate it. The questions that emerge as a result of this and resurface in the course of this work include those concerning the political viability of the post-structuralist claim of the instability of identity and discourse; and the processes of the marginalisation of alternatives to ethnic politics in Kosovo. Campbell’s approach is a timely intervention into debates about ‘ethnic conflict’ in the post-Cold War era, yet it leaves certain questions unanswered when applied to Kosovo.

Campbell describes ethnicity as "a term that signifies relationships of power in the problematic of identity/difference rather than ... a signifier for which there is a stable referent" (Campbell, 1998:92). As such, ethnicity is not an innately given characteristic, but a means of organising social difference. This approach has been outlined by anthropologists and sociologists, yet has been slow to be incorporated into international relations or political science literature. Campbell's argument builds on the work of Barth, who conceptualises ethnicity as "the organization of cultural difference through the boundaries that dichotomize groups" (Campbell, 1998:91). This means that it is not the 'stuff' of ethnicity, the features to which it refers, that matters, but its role in organizing difference. Thus, it follows that conflict on the basis of ethnicity is a result of the dominance and exclusivity of one identity, rather than the inherently violent 'nature' of ethnic identities. This is a tentative answer to an important and complex question: is it the ‘content’ of ethnic identities that makes violent conflict possible, or the severity of the boundary-drawing process, which can turn difference into otherness? The suggestion here is that ethnic difference does not in itself lead to violence, but that processes of othering are what prompt it. However, the question remains as to whether ethnicity is particularly amenable to being constructed in such an exclusivist fashion. Language, religion, race and other social markers that can be subsumed under the label ‘ethnicity’ have historically been shown to be amenable to
being made politically salient, despite being discursively constructed. The important distinction is between ethnicity as a social marker and nationalism as a political ideology: nationalism draws on ethnicity to construct a political programme disrespectful to difference, to exclude for the purpose of defining who can be included, but this does not mean that ethnic identities are violent per se. Comaroff makes a similar argument, describing ethnicity as "a set of relations" rather than an "immanent capacity" (Campbell, 1998:92). This is the difference between Campbell's work and much other IR literature on 'ethnic conflict': his refusal to accept ethnicity as an independent explanatory variable and his concern with the disciplining qualities of social signifiers. In contrast, Buzan et al acknowledge the social construction of ethnic identities yet assert their stability to the extent that they can be objectively analysed. Campbell adopts a post-structuralist approach to the concept of identity, contesting the notion of pre-given and fixed identities, and of the sovereign subject. Identity is an inescapable aspect of being, but can only be known in relation to difference. Difference has the potential to be translated into otherness, and it is on this basis that he contests ethnic and nationalist politics, because they are an exclusivist form of politics that does not act responsibly towards the Other. Rather than see "Serb" and "Albanian" as two pre-existing identities that were manipulated so that they clashed, Campbell’s approach suggests that identity creation is an ongoing process, that Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian identities were/are being (re)created through certain practices, using history and tradition as resources in that process. Physical violence is just one of these practices, albeit the most extreme, and arguably most effective one. Campbell makes an explicit argument concerning violence and its relationship to the political and identity. Rather than see violence as the result of particular identities, as the "surface expression of a deeper cause" (Campbell, 1998:85), he conceptualises violence as complicit in identity creation. He introduces the notion of performativity to account for this, to conceptualise violence as a "mode of transcription" with "a constitutive role in identity politics" (Campbell, 1998:85). As such, issues of ethnicity become "questions of history violently deployed in the present for contemporary political goals" (Campbell, 1998:86). History is politicized in this account, seen as a resource in the political struggle rather than a cause of conflict, as instrumentalist as well as primordialist accounts would have it (Campbell, 1998:84). Campbell’s approach can be effectively applied to Kosovo: events of 1998, following the self-proclamation of the KLA, the killing of several Serb policemen in the Drenica region and the resultant Serb police crackdown are particularly revealing if analysed in light of the claim that identity and action are mutually constitutive. The basic claim made in relation to Bosnia and applied here to Kosovo is that representations (by "participants" as well as
"observers") of Kosovo as an 'ethnic conflict' "obscure the relationship between violence, identity, and the political" and are thus "ultimately depoliticizing" (Campbell, 1998:34). So the task is to politicize such representations, by deconstructing them, to show that the identities that are represented are not unitary and fixed, and that resistance is possible.

Narratives of history and of demographics are two of the most common ways of representing difference in Kosovo. Kosovo is widely described as the cradle of Serb civilization, its population however 90% Albanian, 10% Serb. This seemingly harmless statistic is inherently political, as statistics do not merely reflect reality, but create a ‘population’ (Campbell, 1998:79). This forms the basis of most accounts of conflict in Kosovo: the existence of two pre-given, conflicting communities, in whose name violent acts were committed. Campbell’s approach problematizes this construction, asserting that in committing such acts, the identities of Kosovo Serb’ and Kosovo Albanian’ were constituted. Identities are always multiple and fluid, but drawing on the past to legitimise violence helped constitute the two communities as unitary and antagonistic. This played out in Kosovar community in the late 1990s, as a hardening and radicalisation of identities along essentialist lines occurred as a result of violence (Husanovic, 2000:270).

Kosovo is historically known as a special place for both Serbs and Albanians, and this relies on what Campbell calls the "founding moment" (Campbell, 1998:26). The establishment of the League of Prizren in 1878 is a founding moment for Albanian nationalism, a temporal coup de force which portrays the Albanian nation as natural, always existing and everlasting. This functions in a similar way to the memory of the 1346 founding of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in Kosovo. The events form the basis of the two competing claims to Kosovo, based on an "ontopological" link (Campbell, 1998:80) between identity and territory. Historical events such as the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje are taken as landmark events in the area’s past that set the scene for the antagonism of the late twentieth century. Similarly, the Albanian kacak tradition is often cited as pivotal in the conduct of Serb-Albanian relations, the tradition of Albanian rebels fighting first the Turks and Serbs in 1912 and 1913, then the Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians in WWI, then the Serbs in the 1990s (Judah, 2000:21). Such events or traditions are established as successor 'chapters' in the history of the Serb and Albanian nations after their founding moments. However, such teleological interpretations have a depoliticising effect. What is needed is an “eminently political theory of narration” (Lincoln, 1999:149), which Campbell approaches via a deconstructive approach, which suggests that "the conflict is constituted in the present, and that "history" is a resource in the contemporary struggle" (Campbell,
1998:84). This builds on the idea of ethnicity as a means of organising difference in society. This is not to argue for 'abolishing' ethnicity, as identity formation is dependent on difference, but it is to be aware of the political consequences of historical representations (Campbell, 1998:84). The driving force of Campbell’s deconstructive project is that ethnic or nationalist politics is an exclusivist, violent form of politics that is disrespectful of difference, turning it into otherness and acting aggressively against it. This can be seen in Kosovo, where ethnic difference became the key organising device in society, turning neighbours and friends into Serbs or Albanians, the hated Other, and nothing else. Thus the task of the analyst is to identify tensions in the dominant narrative, and present counter-narratives, to identify the sites of resistance to nationalist or ethnic politics, so as to reveal the incomplete hegemony of such violent politics. For example, it is only since the disintegration of Yugoslavia that Kosovo Serbs have abandoned use of the Latin alphabet in favour of the Cyrillic alphabet; and amongst Kosovo Albanians there is dispute over which dialect of the Albanian language (Gheg or Tosk, for example) should be their official language (International Crisis Group, 1998). Examples such as these reveal the differences and disputes within each group that are obscured by the differences between the two groups.

However, the example of the Albanian kacak tradition is a good one when critically examining Campbell’s approach. Whilst he is right to criticise essentialist approaches that assert a simple historical continuity between the past and the present, he should pay more attention to such practices as they form a crucial part of the cultural resources that actors draw upon in making a claim concerning security. This does not serve to legitimise violent practices, but asks why culture is so problematic in international relations theory. This is not to suggest that all Albanians observe the kacak tradition, nor necessarily to legitimise it, but to bring it into play as a feature of the cultural landscape that needs to be negotiated, to see it as a practice operating in the discursive field of Albanian identity practices.

Demographics are another field in which deconstruction can serve to unsettle what is taken for granted. Birthrates and immigration became politicized, and eventually securitized practices linked to domination of Kosovo. Attitudes towards motherhood, and its relationship to womanhood and nationalism are a useful way of seeing the political consequences of seemingly neutral practices. It can be seen that demographic issues further entrench the idea of Serb-Albanian antagonism by constructing separate and competing identity categories. An ethnicized discourse on demographic issues obscures the other, non-ethnic identities people invariably hold and also serves to obscure issues of class and gender domination. Such a discourse can be deliberately
manipulated by those seeking political gain, but it also operates as a frame within which less cynical practices occur, participating in the construction of the discursive field of Kosovo. Examples of the ethnicization of the discursive field include: the 1986 Petition of Belgrade intellectuals voicing concern at high Kosovo Albanian birthrates; and the mythic image of the Mother of the Jugovici, an epic heroine whose nine sons died fighting the Turks at Kosovo in 1389 and whose reputation was repeatedly summoned by the Serbian press and Serbian Orthodox Church (Bracewell, 1996). All of these examples are part of a wider discourse of genocide against Serbs in Kosovo. Ethnicized discourses circulated in Kosovo Albanian society too: the Kosovo Information Centre in Pristina, a "de facto organ of the shadow government", 'proves' Serb plans for the colonisation of Kosovo by distributing reproductions of a 1937 text by Vaso Cubrilovic, a Serb nationalist ideologue, entitled "The Expulsion of the Albanians", which discusses the need to rid Kosovo of Albanians (International Crisis Group, 1998:5). Rather than interpret such texts as evidence of ethnic hatred, of the expression of a pre-given identity, it is more useful to see them as interventions in the discursive field of social relations in Kosovo that played a role in creating antagonism by drawing on certain representations of the past and not others. The effect of this relates to how conflict in Kosovo is thought about and responded to. If identities are seen as pre-given, they can be taken for granted as conflictual, without analysing the processes by which they became constructed as conflictual. Taking identity processes into consideration means the strategies taken in response to 'ethnic conflict' need to change.

One of the most explicit and most often cited examples of a practice facilitated by ethnicized discourse concerning Kosovo is the speech made by Milosevic in 1987 at Kosovo Polje. Visiting the site of the 1389 battle, making a speech that enflamed Serb nationalism, claiming that "no one shall dare beat you again"⁷, he drew on historical memory and popular conceptions of Serb-Albanian relations to gain currency as the protector of the Serbs, to mobilise support for his own political platform. Accepting Campbell's claim that the ethnic identities on which these claims were based are not a pre-given, innate characteristic but a discursive practice, it can be seen that key moments in conflict in Kosovo such as this involved actors "reproducing and rearticulating a historical representation and violently deploying it in the present to constitute ... (individual and/or collective) subjectivity" (Campbell, 1998:83). This means that ideas of "Serbdom" or "Albanianism" are deployed to create contemporary

⁷ The exact wording of this is disputed (Campbell, 1998:74) but the effect is always the same: Milosevic presenting himself as defender of Serbdom. This is a good example of the idea that it is not what 'actually' happened but what people come to believe happened that is important. The concepts of narrative and myth are explored at a later stage.
Serb and Albanian identities in Kosovo, rather than merely resurrected in an age-old struggle. This does not deny that ethnic identities resonated in Kosovo, but attempts to show that they are not 'natural' and thus, that their privileging over other identities is the result of specific political practices. The same principle can be applied to other examples, be they violence committed by Serb police or paramilitary groups or the KLA, repressive laws passed by the Serb authorities, or the parallel structures established by Kosovo Albanians to provide education and health services and so on. The practices differ markedly, but the logic remains the same, that of two nations stemming back into history that require their own territorial space in which to live.

Campbell mentions this (1998:94), but despite arguing against the nationalist imaginary as inherently violent, notes with approval the “markedly different political results of their [similar] argument”. This is problematic as it complicates the question of whether it is the intensity of the boundary-drawing practices or the actual content of discursively constructed identities that forms the representational basis for violence. Interestingly, Barth admits in 1994 that the selection of diacritica is not as “haphazard” as he claimed in 1969 (Neumann, 1999:5), which further complicates thinking on this topic. The suggestion here is that it is the exclusivist constructions of ethnicity that came to dominate in Kosovo that facilitated violence. This leads to a fundamental question concerning Campbell’s approach. Whilst resistance to violence can be found in Kosovo, there is much less resistance to ethnicized politics per se: pro-coexistence initiatives (detailed in Clark, 2000) were often framed in terms of two ethnic communities. Although a radicalisation of identities can be described as a result rather than a cause of violence in the late 1990s, this should not obscure the idea that an ethnicized discourse did resonate in Kosovo prior to this immediate period. Campbell is right to assert that identities and actions are mutually constitutive, that violence helps create the actor rather than emerging as a result of an actor holding a particular identity. However, with the notion of performativity he specifically refers to the materialization rather than construction of identity, so as to avoid the opposition between idealism and materialism (Campbell, 1998:25). This is what needs to be explored further, as the pool of resources from which identities can be materialized is never infinite, and in Kosovo it became an ethnicized pool. This does not require an essentialist argument but does necessitate an acknowledgement and exploration of the narrowing of the discursive field around ethnicity.

If Buzan et al have important insights into the dynamics of security practices, yet operate with a petrified concept of identity, reifying ethnic identity, and if David Campbell successfully problematizes the dominant representation of ‘ethnic conflict’ yet fails to appreciate that not any identity can be adopted, where does this leave
analysis of conflict in Kosovo? There are elements of both approaches that can be combined, such as the speech act, performativity and the social construction of identities, whilst taking a specific theoretical approach to 'ethnicity', namely an interpretive one that sees it as a boundary-drawing practice rather than an objective condition. The work of Pierre Bourdieu is helpful in this regard, exploding many of the conventional dichotomies surrounding ethnicity and concerning itself with the practical politics of identity. It is useful in exploring the emergence of ethnicized politics in Kosovo and also the emergence of violence in the second half of the 1990s.

3. The materialization of identities from a restricted field: Pierre Bourdieu

Bourdieu's sociology is concerned with the logic of everyday practices, introducing the concepts of habitus, fields and capital. Habitus can be defined as "an acquired system of generative schemes", making possible "the free production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the particular conditions of its production - and only those" (Bourdieu, 1990:55). This navigates a path between structural determinism and post-structuralist voluntarism and resonates both with Buzan et al and Campbell, whilst modifying both approaches. Bourdieu's emphasis on the tendency towards reproduction of the habitus and the practices it engenders links to Buzan et al's claim of petrified identities whilst linking in to Campbell's claim that identity needs constant (re)inscription. Bourdieu claims that habitus produces practices which "tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their generative principle" (Bourdieu, 1977:78). Thus the importance of the economic base of the social formation in question, which is underplayed in post-structuralist accounts of difference, is reintroduced to political analysis (Lovell, 2000). Within a given habitus there are a number of fields, "structured spaces of positions" (Bourdieu, 1993:72), in which actors must deploy the relevant type of capital (recognition accrued in a given field) in order to be effective. There are numerous fields in operation at any time in any place, and they can be competing as well as complementary. Actors have to negotiate between them, often transforming capital efficient in one field into another. The structure of a field is "a state of the distribution of the specific capital which has been accumulated in the course of previous struggles and which orients subsequent strategies" (Bourdieu, 1993:73). This emphasises that habitus is "history turned into nature" (Bourdieu, 1977:78), an unconscious system of dispositions, within the fields of which actors must deploy the relevant type of capital. For an actor to execute an effective practice, s/he must successfully perform a speech act, which
combines both the linguistic capability to make a claim and the social capability to have it accepted.

Bourdieu's approach is very useful when considering issues of resistance to a hegemonic politics, as the idea of the necessary accumulation of "legitimate competence" (Bourdieu, 1991:44) in order to be effective is a useful way in to thinking about the failure of non-violent politics in Kosovo. The vital factor in situations of domination is the complicity of those being dominated (Bourdieu, 1991:164). Antagonism and conflict over specific goals presupposes for Bourdieu a universal acceptance of the stakes of the game. Thus, even though Kosovo Albanians were in conflict with Milosevic and the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) authorities and both sets of actors had diametrically opposing goals, there was an underlying acceptance of what the situation was about, what the stakes and rules of the game were; that is, the habitus was ethnicized. This is what is obscured in Campbell’s analysis and is revealed by the persistence of ethnicized discourses even when practices were aimed at resisting exclusivism and violence.

When considering action, Bourdieu is concerned with everyday practices, explaining them in terms of the logic of habitus and the rules of particular fields (of economics, politics, education, and so on) as a result of the doxic state of affairs. “Doxa” (Bourdieu, 1977:64) refers to underlying dispositions that are so taken for granted that they do not even get recognised as orthodox, they are simply seen as natural. So the task of a "heretical discourse" is to show the doxa to be unnatural, to make a break with the given state of affairs, and to assert a new 'common sense‘ which, if successfully done, will itself become the new doxa (Bourdieu, 1991:128-129). As Lincoln (1989:8, 11) says, “sentiment”, to which discourse is pivotal, "holds society together", so a "disruptive discourse" must i) gain a hearing; ii) be persuasive; and iii) call forth a following. This means that ethnicized politics, and later resistance to exclusivism both needed discursive resonance to have any chance of success as heretical or disruptive discourses against the doxa of Communism and exclusivism respectively. The success of the former and marginalisation of the latter are thus to be traced to their relationship to social "sentiment” or "doxa”.

4. Transformation of the field (1)

Under Tito, Yugoslavism functioned in a variety of ways: although people may have identified themselves in ethnic terms, this was not openly reflected in political and social life. The Yugoslav constitution gave people the right not to choose a national
identity, and both republics and constituent nations had national rights\(^8\). This means that national self-determination rights were not linked to territory. However, Communism simultaneously effaced and encouraged ethnic sentiment, for example via the ethnic key system, which ensured ethnic proportionality in the federal system (Comaroff, 1991:676; Hall, 1999:286). With the death of Tito and the poor economic situation\(^9\), Yugoslavism started to fade and was eventually replaced by ethnicized fields, not because it was only Tito’s charisma that held Yugoslavia together, but because his death and a desperate economic situation presented a moment of crisis in which renegotiation of political practices was necessary. State collapse and economic discontent do not in themselves account for the sociological transformation whereby enmity emerges, however. This must be linked to the transformation of perceptions, of the legal system for example, whereby by autumn 1991 justice was seen to be influenced by ethnic affiliations (Woodward, 1995:255; Ignatieff, 1998:43). Even perceptions of people’s physical characteristics are subject to this ethnicization: Mertus (1999:7) and Woodward (1995:236) refer to the “racialization” and ”physicalizing” respectively of social and political relations, processes which can be better understood in light of Bourdieu’s argument about the importance of the “em-bodiment” of experience, whereby “bodily hexis” and physical characteristics come to take on social and political significance (Bourdieu, 1977:93).

When Campbell states that “political transformation in the wake of the collapse of communism put in place the differences that violence later sought to confirm” (Campbell, 1998:193), he is attempting to get away from the "iron hand" argument which claims that Tito’s death lifted the lid on the bubbling ethnic sentiments that had been repressed for years. And he is right, to an extent. Whilst the fall of Communism did not simply allow the re-emergence of previously buried identities and antagonisms, it can be described as the demise of a particular mode of politics, with its concomitant sites of capital and practices, and its replacement by another mode. Salecl calls this the “struggle for hegemony” by which “[t]he national threat became the strongest point of identification on which the opposition as well as the establishment relied”, after a three-phase disintegration of the ideology of self-management starting in the

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8 Under the Yugoslav constitution, nationality and citizenship were not synonymous. Nationality could be conferred by virtue of being a member of a narod, a nation or people, but citizenship was separate from, and additional to nationality. Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces, all officially known as “socio-political communities”, which were analytically distinct from the nations and nationalities living in them. The basis of the Yugoslav federal system was that “republics were entities for ‘nations’ as opposed to ‘nationalities’”. A nation (narod) such as the Serbs ”was potentially a state-forming unit ... and therefore formed a republic in a federation”. A nationality (narodnost) such as the Albanians ”was a displaced bit of a nation” with a national homeland elsewhere, and ”it could not be a constituent nation in a federation, and could not have a federal unit of its own” (Malcolm, 1998:327-328).

9 Poverty cannot be seen as a cause of ethnic tension, as the phenomenon also arises in affluent areas. What is asserted here is the role of poverty in the emergence of a moment of crisis in Kosovo.
1960s (Salecl, 1994: 207-210). Economic problems led to social discontent and polarization, which was not just expressed in ethnic terms, but also in gender and class terms (Woodward, 1995:56, 73). However, given aspects of the Yugoslav system like the ethnic key (proportionality) requirement, ethnicity became increasingly socially and politically salient. So social discontent and the sociological processes whereby this can be expressed in ethnic terms is the problem that needs to be addressed, rather than ethnic antagonism per se.

These ethnic identities will not have been “old” identities “re-emergent”, but contemporary identities constructed by drawing on history and tradition. Although “some ethnic labels have been around for a long time” (Comaroff, 1991:671), their meaning changes across time and space. Cultures do not exist unchanged over time but are more dynamic than is usually accepted: ethnic identities post-Communism will be different to ethnic identities under Communism, even if the label remains the same. Constructed in this way, one does not have to deny or dismiss nationalist agitation under Communism, such as the Movement for the Unification of Albanians of the early 1960s, led by Adem Demaci (Malcolm, 1998:322) or the Kosovo Albanian riots of 1968 (Ramet, 1996:18). The demise of Yugoslavism in Kosovo can be said to have started in the 1960s, with Tito’s move to “abandon the attempt to create a homogeneous “Yugoslavism” and encourage more elements of national self-direction instead” (Malcolm, 1998:324). This does not suggest an unchanging thread of Albanianism running through the history of Yugoslavia, but a more dynamic process of identity creation and recreation that drew on the past for legitimation. In this way, it becomes possible to understand the ‘history’ of conflict in Kosovo without asserting essential identities. Thus the problem in Kosovo was not “ethnic conflict” but part of “the collapse and rejection of an overarching legal authority and of a capacity to tolerate and manage difference” (Woodward, 1995:380). This emergent field did not have to be an ethnicized field (in analytical terms), and does not require an essentialist conception of ethnicity, but asks how one way of organising social difference came to dominate over others and how, in political terms, it was likely that this emergent field would be ethnicized.

There are two broad reasons why ethnicity came to dominate in Kosovo\textsuperscript{10}. Firstly, ethnicity encompasses a huge range of social signifiers, many aspects of social life can be subsumed under the category of ethnicity: history, tradition, religion and so on can all be very successfully framed by it. Secondly, ethnicity was a strategically useful means of organising social difference for political gain, most notably by Milosevic. The construction of an enemy Other against which to further internal cohesion was
politically expedient, but such political entrepreneurism could only proceed on the basis of the representations circulating in Kosovar society: Milosevic’s claims had to be accepted by Serbs and Kosovo Serbs. This does not suggest a pre-given identity, as Milosevic played a role in constituting Serbdom, the group in whose name he spoke: this is implied by Bourdieu’s conception of the speech act (Bourdieu, 1991:ch8). So the two reasons interact. The benefit of this approach is that it avoids blackboxing cultures as homogeneous, unchanging wholes and falling into cultural relativism, and avoids asserting a liberal vision of politics. This does not cast the people of Kosovo and Serbia as irrational or ‘led astray’ but asks questions about the emergence of nationalist politics and the carrying out of violence in its name. This transformation in habitus used the same practices cited in primordialist and instrumentalist approaches, such as the use of history as legitimation for claims to Kosovo. What is different is the explanation of those practices. Taking the example of the historical continuity of the Serb nation, Kaser and Halpern (1998) specifically apply Bourdieu’s concept of capital to the creation of myth in Kosovo, outlining how Milosevic evoked the historical capital of Kosovo, held in the form of liminal memories, in order to reconstitute the national identity of the Serbian people. This shows how ethnicity can be pivotal to conflict without relying on an essentialist conception of it.

5. Implications of a Bourdieusian sociology
Before going on to discuss in more detail the implications of an analysis of Kosovo informed by Bourdieu, it is instructive to consider his work in relation to both Waever, Buzan et al and Campbell, to think about the implications for how conflict in Kosovo is analysed. The Copenhagen School authors explicitly draw on the work of Bourdieu when formulating the speech act aspect of their securitization approach, which helps explain why exclusivist narratives came to dominate over pro-coexistence narratives. However, given the synthesis of approaches in the text (those of Buzan and Waever), they do not dwell on the Bourdieusian aspects of the facilitating conditions for a speech act and theorization of the concept of audience. Bourdieusian sociology would bolster their argument concerning societal security and the issues of ethnicity but would disturb the delicate balance between the approaches of Buzan and Waever held together in the 1998 text. However, the criticism still stands that they ‘freeze’ a situation in analysing it, hiding the complexity of a situation in an attempt to identify the security dynamic at play. The criticism is similar to that made of Bourdieu by Lovell, namely that “he draws attention away from those other areas of social space where the constructedness of social reality may be tacitly acknowledged or exposed”

10 Tarak Barkawi, personal communication, 26.8.01.
(Lovell, 2000:32), which is important in terms of resistance to violence in Kosovo. However, both Bourdieu and the Copenhagen School authors are concerned with everyday or dominant practices, not the exceptions to them. Bourdieu's sociology also effectively problematizes aspects of Campbell's approach. The first critique of Campbell's analysis as applied to Kosovo links directly to Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Campbell asserts that the representation of conflict as "ethnic" suggests that "the historical animus has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out". Even in accounts that are not explicitly primordialist, "the plurality of possibilities that might be thought to exist at any given present are severely constricted" (Campbell, 1998:84-85). Campbell's argument against this is informed by a post-structuralist approach that asserts multiplicity and fluidity of identity, and a discursive materialization of reality. However, when the concept of habitus is introduced, this approach must be modified, and the 'constriction' of the "plurality of possibilities" must be taken seriously. This bears fruit when one considers that even though there was widespread resistance in Kosovo to violence, there was much less questioning of the ethnicized frame of reference. Examples of non-violent yet ethnicized politics include Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the parallel health and education systems, the pro-coexistence approach of Veton Surroi, the student movement based at the University of Pristina and the Serb Orthodox monks of Decani. Bourdieu's concept of habitus is not structurally determinist, indeed it explodes the dichotomy between structure and agency as the impetus to action, as it asserts that choice is indeed possible and necessary but within certain limits.

As May (2001) points out, although Bourdieu originally formulated the concept in relation to social class, there is no reason why it cannot be applied to ethnicity, which similarly acts as a means of organising social difference. This is fully compatible with an interpretive approach to ethnicity as outlined by Campbell, drawing on Barth, Comaroff and other sociologists. However, even if ethnicity is to be regarded as "a set of relations", even if "ethnic identities ... are not constitutive, let alone the cause, of the recent conflict ... [but] their modern manifestation is an effect of that conflict" (Comaroff, 1991:670), the concept of habitus is still useful in exploring the emergence of conflict in Kosovo. The question becomes: why were/are ethnic identities more materializable in Kosovo than the other identities which were salient in people's lives? Of course, this is not to suggest that ethnicity was the only discourse resonating in Kosovo: Campbell is right in this respect, that there is a plurality of possible identities. The point becomes to ask how ethnicity came to dominate.
Hansen formulates her critique of Campbell by arguing the need to problematize the "a priori existence of non-nationalist forces" (as progressive social forces may still be "soft-nationalistic" in character) and accept that to conduct a political process a "minimum of community" is required (Hansen, 1998:239). It may be that this "minimum of community" is missing in Kosovo. However, even if this is so, this is not 'natural' or unproblematic, but the result of political practices. Campbell argues that all identities are susceptible to deconstruction, but:

"as the Bosnian war so savagely illustrated, Bosnia’s was perhaps more susceptible to deconstruction than most. That susceptibility, however, stems not from any inherent weakness of nonethnic, nonnationalist, non-ontological politics. It stems from a particular conjunction of circumstances in which the investments in ethnonationalist politics by actors both internal and external to the situation were too great to be overcome easily" (Campbell, 1998:218).

This, along with the "obvious differences in the intensity of feeling associated with the logic of alignment between territory and identity in Europe and the United States when compared to the former Yugoslavia" (Campbell, 1998:168), is precisely what needs to be explored, and is usefully approached from a Bourdieusian perspective.

6. Transformation of the field (2)

A Bourdieusian approach suggests that by the mid-1990s the field of Yugoslavism had been replaced by an ethnicized field in which nationalist politics flourished. It also suggests that social class and socioeconomic factors are central to the shape of the habitus. The argument here (based on Bourdieu, 1991:ch.8) is that the unequal distribution of cultural capital in Kosovo facilitated the concentration of political capital in the hands of Milosevic and Rugova and their respective cohorts in the two, ethnicized political fields (Serb and Albanian). Because ordinary people were divested of the cultural capital necessary for active participation in politics, those with the requisite capital were able to dominate. Thus it is not coincidental that the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was a key actor in generating Serb nationalist sentiment, via their 1986 Memorandum for example, and that the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo and the Association of Writers of Kosovo were central to the development of Kosovo Albanian political culture post-1989 (Malcolm, 1996:347-8). This is where Campbell's "[f]ailure adequately to locate the social contexts of the representational practices he examines" (Laffey, 2000:430) becomes a problem. This Bourdieusian explanation applies to the rise of politicians generally, bringing the idea of social class back in to the study of the formation of 'ethnic groups'. With regards to the question of why ethnicity was the basis on which the groups were founded, the ethnicization of social and political life in Kosovo can be understood in light of the power of ethnicity as a boundary-drawing practice and strategic moves by
political actors. These combine to mean that "[a]t the end of the [nineteen] eighties, a new series of, primarily national, points of identification emerged which totally redefined the terms of the struggle of ideological hegemony" (Salecl, 1994:209). Comaroff believes the reason for the emergence of conflict along ethnic lines lies in "epochal transformations of ... economy and society - and the structural conditions that have set them in motion" (Comaroff, 1991:671). The impact of structural changes is an essential component of analysis of Kosovo, and is fully compatible with the idea of the Yugoslavist field being replaced by an ethnicized field. The decline of the ideology of self-management and the waning of Titoism since the 1960s, partly characterisable as social polarization as a result of economic distress, allowed the emergence of nationalism as a field to replace it. It thus becomes comprehensible how "[a]n essential feature of the ideological efficiency of the nationalist parties was their ability to subordinate all real (economic) problems to the problem of national identity" (Salecl, 1994:225). As Salecl says, "one of the elements in the rise of Serbian nationalism under Milosevic's leadership has been Milosevic's capacity to ... recognize himself as the addressee of the workers' demands" (Salecl, 1994:207). So it is possible to see after the death of Tito a transformative moment when meaning of social signifiers was up for grabs, when there was potential for the political field to take on a different character: but according to Bourdieu, within certain limits.

The concept of narrative is helpful in exploring the emergence of ethnicized politics in Kosovo. Eric Ringmar (1997) challenges the "modern orthodoxy" in a theoretical move away from the concept of a pregiven, coherent self, which resonates with Campbell’s post-structuralist approach. However, Campbell, as a post-structuralist, cannot "forge politically implementable stories of self” (Neumann, 1999:109) because of his lack of an “as if” story. “As if” stories are central to a narrative theory of action such as Ringmar’s, which works well in tandem with a Copenhagen School approach. The latter stipulates that actors must tell stories about themselves and get them recognised by an audience to be successful, which is the basis of the securitization approach. Alternatively, Ringmar claims that if one’s identity is denied recognition, one option is to act to try to force one’s identity upon the audience (Ringmar, 1997:82), and a common way of doing this is to fight (Neumann, 1999:224). So it can be seen that, whether one’s story is accepted or not, extraordinary (often violent) measures are a likely outcome. So the emergence of ethnicized narratives in Kosovo at both elite and popular levels is of paramount importance.

Narratives, and the mythic discourses surrounding Serb and Albanian links to Kosovo need to be analysed as a dynamic process in which “[m]yth and group are ... linked in a symbiotic relation of co-reproduction” (Lincoln, 1999:210), rather than as
manifestations of an essential Serb or Albanian character linked inextricably to the territory of Kosovo. So, as Mertus (1999) explains, cases such as the Paracin massacre\textsuperscript{11}, the Martinovic case\textsuperscript{12}, and the alleged mass poisoning of Kosovo Albanian schoolchildren\textsuperscript{13} are important because they are pivotal moments in the shaping of popular conceptions of social life in Kosovo, but not because they are ‘evidence’ of ethnic hatred. Their resonance in popular discourse in Kosovo ensures the “invocation of select moments from the past” through which “social identities are continually (re)-constructed” (Lincoln, 1989:23, emphasis in original). At the elite level, the role of heroism and treason are pivotal to Milosevic’s use of the Kosovo myth. The concept of heroism functioned to “cut down any alternative possibilities to solve the conflict in Kosovo in a manner that would be ‘less heroic’”, and the concept of treason “was used as a basis for the elimination … of all political forces and individuals in Serbia which were having in mind alternatives other than the official ones” (Vekaric, 2000). The salience of ethnicized narratives and ability of actors at all levels to implement practices on this basis does not point to an unchangeable ethnic, violent character of Kosovar society. It signifies rather a convergence of factors, for example the demise of a Communist political field, a very poor economic situation, and skilful political rhetoric by actors in the political field which facilitated the emergence of an ethnicized form of politics. Thus, the argument that “nationalist politicians had to draw out the ethnic element in all these social bonds and identities [to the village/town, the region, to friends, neighbours etc], nationalize it, and win the loyalty of citizens” (Woodward, 1995:225) is apt. It disputes the ‘mobilisation of latent nationalist passions’ thesis whilst accepting the resonance of ethnicity. Much work had to be done to create conflict, yet ethnicity is not denied as socially salient.

Having explored how Yugoslavism was replaced by ethnic nationalism in Kosovo, it is instructive to consider events in the political field to try to see how it was that an antagonistic nationalism-based politics emerged. What is vital is to compare the positions taken to the positions available to be taken (Bourdieu, 1991: ch.8, Bourdieu, 1993:155) as, despite the potential for transformation provided by the ‘moment of crisis’ and despite the analytical possibility of the discursive construction of a whole range of identities, the discursive resources from which positions could be constructed were finite, and centred around ethnicity. Thus, the transformations in the rest of Yugoslavia had a profound impact on Kosovo, as by the start of the 1990s, groups

\textsuperscript{11} The killing and wounding of fellow soldiers by (Albanian) Yugoslav army conscript Aziz Kelmendi (Mertus, 1999:135-174).

\textsuperscript{12} The case of Djordje Martinovic, an elderly Serb taken to hospital for wounds resulting from impalement on a broken bottle, allegedly at the hands of Kosovo Albanians (Mertus, 1999:95-134).

\textsuperscript{13} The sudden, mass succumbing of Kosovo Albanian schoolchildren to nausea and other symptoms of poisoning, allegedly carried out by Kosovo Serbs (Mertus, 1999:175-226).
classed as nationalities with cultural rights began to claim nation status and the political rights this afforded\textsuperscript{14}. In this atmosphere, Kosovo Albanians could "insist that they had always been a constituent nation" (Woodward, 1995:340) and have this claim resonate with those who supported them. Even those who opposed their claim recognised the logic in which the argument was being made. Political parties have only a relational existence, and a political discourse's success depends not only on the efficacy of the speaker but also its resonance with an audience, a group "which he helps to produce" (Bourdieu, 1991:184, 223, 190; see also Lincoln, 1989:8). The establishment by Rugova of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) makes more sense when thought about in relation to the mass adoption of strategies of civil or non-violent resistance by Kosovar Albanians in the 1990s. This is not to draw a simplistic link between 'national traits' and political practices, but to take seriously Bourdieu's idea that the spokesperson helps to create the group in whose name s/he speaks. David Campbell's approach fits with this idea of mutual constitution, and with the emphasis on the effort required to maintain this discourse, focussing as he does on the need for constant reinscription. However, it is Bourdieu's sociological approach, emphasising that choice of position is not totally free, which diminishes the plausibility of Campbell's approach.

"Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the categories which make it possible, are the stakes par excellence of the political struggle" (Bourdieu, 1991:236). This resonates with Campbell's claim that violence is more about the constitution of identities than their inevitable antagonism. The political field follows a logic of supply and demand, with political capital being concentrated in the hands of a few, all the more so when the majority are deprived of the cultural capital necessary to participate actively in the political field; this means that the electorate is reduced to a group of consumers who must choose between the available products (Bourdieu, 1991:171-172). However, whilst this idea leaves space for actors in Kosovo such as the "Kosova Alternative", the student movement, women's groups and the Post-Pessimists (Clark, 2000), what is crucial is the ability to make claims that resonate. It is the "class unconscious" as opposed to the Marxist idea of a class consciousness (Bourdieu 1991:232, 235) that facilitates political action. What is needed then, is an exploration of "the shift from the practical sense of the position occupied, which is itself capable of being made explicit in different ways, to properly political demonstrations" (Bourdieu, 1991:243-244).

\textsuperscript{14} See footnote 7, p18. The political rights of nation status are important because a nation "retained some ultimate right of secession when it formed a republic in a federation" (Malcolm, 1998:328).
The emergence of a situation of explicit repression of Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s must therefore be seen as the convergence of various factors, the emergence of a potentially predictable situation that was by no means inevitable. The ethnicization of daily life came about through historical processes and formed a durable but not 'natural' or necessary way of life, made forceful by its institution (in the Bourdieusian sense) in the form of political parties such as Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Given the widespread poverty in Kosovo, and the restricted access of much of the population to instruments of cultural capital, this habitus was even more likely to be reproduced, as political capital was concentrated in the hands of the nationalist parties. As Salecl says:

"those who lost out were the liberals. The reason for their failure can be located precisely in the fact that they were unable to articulate nationalism ....The liberals did not realize that what mattered is not so much the economic problems as the way these problems are symbolized through ideology" (Salecl, 1994:225).

This helps explain the successful electoral campaign of Zeljko Raznatovic, for example: a Serbian paramilitary leader and accused war criminal, he was elected representative of the Party of Serb Unity from Kosovo to the Serb Parliament in December 1992 with a slogan of “I promise you nothing” and the single claim of “defending the Serbian people”, effectively subordinating all economic and social problems to nationalist ideology (Woodward, 1995:354). What is missing from both liberal political platforms in Kosovo and liberal analyses of events in Kosovo is acknowledgement that "the people cannot be deceived unless they are already structured in such a way that they want to be deceived" (Salecl, 1994:210; see also Zizek, 1999:80). This is crucial to analysis of Kosovo, and argues against Campbell's approach because of the idea that despite resistance to violence, resistance to the construction of politics in ethnicized terms was much weaker.

This argument can be illustrated by the same examples taken in many analyses to prove the primordialist or instrumentalist theses. This shows that this approach is not trying to show that others are wrong, or that they focus on the wrong events, but to change the interpretation of them, to interpret action in Kosovo in a different light. Milosevic's 1987 speech at Kosovo Polje does not therefore signify a moment in which Serb national consciousness was (re)awakened, but one in which it was constituted. The laws passed in the 1990s to discriminate against Kosovo Albanians, such as the law on language use and on property sales did not function merely as means of legislating between two given groups but played a role in creating them: Bourdieu emphasises the importance of the acts of institution. Rugova was not merely harnessing the power of Kosovo Albanians and making it into a political force, but in committing his speech acts was pivotal in constituting the Kosovo Albanians as a
homogeneous group. The benefits of Bourdieu's approach however, is that it acknowledges the likelihood of certain positions being adopted over others, that is, the limits on political choice. Agents "bring into play the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles" (Bourdieu, 1991:239) and different fields require the deployment of different types of capital.

One criticism of the Copenhagen School approach is that they legitimate violent nationalism by privileging it in their analysis. However, drawing further on a Bourdieusian approach would enable analysts to incorporate an emancipatory strand into their work by analysing the failure of coexistence initiatives in Kosovo. By adopting Bourdieu's approach, it becomes possible to think about how and why women's groups, student actions, pacifist initiatives, the so-called Kosova Alternative and Post-Pessimists (see Clark, 2000) failed to capture the political imagination and implement non-violent politics in Kosovo. A Foucauldian conception of power envisages resistance to every domination, and this was clearly the case in Kosovo. It is possible to point out both tensions within the nationalist discourse and explicit resistance to it. However, what is missing is a sustained analysis of their failure. There is a tendency in much literature to assume that Kosovo, as part of the Balkans, cannot produce 'progressive' liberal politics that focuses on democratic procedures, respect for the rule of law and bodily integrity. However, Salecl (1994) and Zizek (1999) both argue against this liberal conception of politics, which means that analysis has to take account of the field and habitus of Kosovar politics without essentializing.

7. Resistance to exclusivism in Kosovo

The Albanian-language daily newspaper Koha Ditore founded in April 1997 and edited by Veton Surroi is one example of resistance to the hegemonic politics of Kosovo. The newspaper is unusual in that "it does not insist on a common Kosovar [Kosovo Albanian] position vis-à-vis Belgrade as the starting point on every issue" (International Crisis Group, 1998:27). Its print run grew from 7,000 to 27,000 in less than a year since its inception, and Surroi is an outspoken critic of antagonistic ethnic politics. The monks of the Serb Orthodox monastery at Decani took in Kosovo Albanians during the NATO bombing, and Roma after the bombing as they became targets of reprisals by Kosovo Albanians (Judah, 2000:288). The people of Cacak formed a small citizens' parliament and called upon the Serb authorities to protect Kosovo Albanians (Judah, 2000:264). In 1996 the Serbian Resistance Movement emerged, led by local businessman Momcilo Trajkovic and Serbian Orthodox religious leaders Bishop Artemje and Father Sava, which was committed to retaining Kosovo as part of Serbia yet called for dialogue with Kosovo Albanians because of the ferocity of
Milosevic’s policies (Judah, 2000:161). Howard Clark also documents civil resistance in Kosovo, detailing the 1990 declaration "For Democracy, Against Violence" which gathered 400,000 signatures (Clark, 2000:57-8) and was followed in the course of the year by the orchestration of the sounding of car horns and five minute protests on the streets at certain times, what Clark terms "semi resistance", small symbolic actions as opposed to riots on the streets. On a more active scale, the "Kosova Alternative circle", made up of "city-dwelling modernisers" were "the most dynamic section of the [nonviolent] movement ", using "the language of pluralism, democracy and a greater say for women" (Clark, 2000:67) in their struggle. These examples are testament to the existence of resistance to violent and exclusivist politics in Kosovo, yet they are not the focus of most accounts of events in Kosovo. So what needs to be explored is not the existence of resistance but its resonance.

What is interesting about the example of the Kosova Alternative is that it throws up the question of liberal politics. Whilst questioning the legitimacy of actors such as Milosevic and the KLA, asking who gets to speak on behalf of a community, it is important as an analyst and a foreign intervener to guard against unquestioningly supporting actors such as those involved with the Kosovo Alternative just because they practise ‘progressive’ politics. What must be explored is their (in)ability to resonate with a wider audience: the description of them as "city-dwelling modernisers" is important, asking the analyst to follow Bourdieu’s approach and look at the relationship of an urban elite to the structure of the field of rural life and Kosovar politics more generally. The same applies to the Post-Pessimists, an "English-speaking elite", a small group of young people acting as the "trailblazers" interested in "pushing back the limits of what was possible in the present situation" (Clark, 2000:149-150).

The salience of examples such as these is that, whilst they signify resistance to a violent hegemonic politics and reveal multiplicity in Kosovar social and political life, they are doomed to fail as there is a dominant mode of politics that militates against their resonance. Another important factor is that resistance by Kosovo Serbs was minimal: resistance to Milosevic and nationalist politics was manifested mainly in Serbia proper, for example by the group Women in Black, who were concerned about Kosovo but struggled to gain support within the province. Thus the effectiveness of Kosovo Albanian resistance was also muted because it was not reciprocated within Kosovo, and long-term, durable coexistence would necessitate mutual participation. This is not to suggest that resistance is hopeless, but that sustained analysis of the fields of practices in Kosovo is vital if resistance to violence is to succeed.

Following Bourdieu, it is possible to think about how such attitudes were marginalized. The basic premise is that by the mid-1990s, resistance to exclusivist ethnic politics...
could not be expressed in such a way so as to resonate, either with elites, ordinary people, or the 'international community'. This was because of the transformations in the political and social fields of Kosovar life to a situation in which the dominant discursive practices centred on exclusivist constructions of ethnicity. This was further entrenched by the impact of the Bosnian war, which encouraged ethnic politics as a way of getting grievances heard, and the stimulus of Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence, which encouraged the LDK to stretch its demand to full sovereignty for Kosovo. The recognition of the KLA by the West and the sidelining of the problems in Kosovo at Dayton and a resultant frustration within Kosovo with Rugova's politics were also salient. All of this points to a dominant mode of politics in contemporary world politics, a mode of what Campbell calls “ontopology”, the nexus between identity and territory (Campbell, 1998:80). In this mode, problems are framed in a particular way and the range of response strategies is concomitantly narrowed. Having thought about the ethnicization of political and social life, and the marginalization of pro-coexistence voices, the next crucial question concerns the transition to violence: how was it that at the start of the 1990s Milosevic was able to implement more explicitly violent policies, and how was it that in the mid-1990s disenchantment with Rugova's politics led to the emergence of the KLA? This requires an analysis of the link between ethnicity and violence, and Arjun Appadurai has formulated a promising argument.

8. The transition to violent conflict: Arjun Appadurai

Appadurai outlines a "hypothesis of treachery" to account for the outbreak of violence in the name of ethnicity (Appadurai, 1996: 154-155), focussing on the arbitrary but not inexplicable nature of such violence. He asks the simple but pertinent question of why, if ethnicity is seen as pre-given and leading to conflict, violence does not break out everywhere (Appadurai, 1996:141). He emphasises the role of diasporic public spheres and the relationship between the local and the global in mobilizing ethnic sentiment. Although ethnic sentiment in Kosovo seems to Western observers to be parochial, a local affair in a far-flung (not-quite-modern) corner of Europe, Appadurai argues that such violence is inexplicable without taking account of its transnational and highly modern and contemporary elements. His conception of ethnicity as "a historically constituted form of social classification that is regularly misrecognized and naturalized as a prime mover in social life" (Appadurai, 1996:140) draws on Comaroff and Barth, evoking similarities to Campbell’s approach. His ideas concerning the politics of affect also links to the work of Bourdieu, who is concerned with the
embodiment of experience\textsuperscript{15}. His argument relates to the idea of culturalism, whereby cultural differences become the "conscious object" of identities (Appadurai, 1968:147) and to Bourdieu's conception of habitus, helping to explain why interpretations of physical characteristics and affect became ethnicized in Kosovo. If affect is "in many ways learned" and as a result, analysts need to explore the "specific cultural frames of meaning and style and larger historical frames of power and discipline" (Appadurai, 1996:147), then the ethnicization of the fields of action in Kosovo becomes of crucial importance. What then follows is the question of how violence becomes possible, even necessary.

Appadurai uses Rosenau's concept of "cascades", fluid sequences of actions, to good effect, linking it to issues of globalisation and diasporas so as to emphasise both the local and the transnational (Appadurai, 1996:150). The concept of cascades helps explain why small, seemingly innocuous events can trigger violence in the name of much grander visions: it may help explain why the KLA killing of Serb policemen and resultant Drenica clampdown can be seen as a transformative moment in Kosovar politics. Appadurai also introduces Tambiah's terms "focalization" - "process of progressive denudation of local incidents ... of their particulars of context and aggregating them, thereby narrowing their concrete richness" - and "transvaluation" - assimilating particulars to a larger, collective, more enduring, and therefore less context-bound, cause or interest" (Appadurai, 1996:151). Linking these terms to the notion of cascades, it becomes possible to see how events in Drenica became linked to events in Kosovo, in FRY and in world politics in the minds of Kosovars. Appadurai asserts that this logic may well be active at a low level without breaking into violence. Progressive focalization and transvaluation are part of what intensify a situation to the extent that a local incident becomes symbolic for a much wider set of social relations. This helps explain the radicalisation of identities between 1996 and 1999, as events are increasingly interpreted through an ethnic lens. The local and the transnational are intimately linked, which can be seen in Kosovo not only by the energetic activity of Kosovo Albanians living in Switzerland, Germany and the USA especially, and of Serbs in the rest of Serbia, but also in processes of modern communications that are at work the world over. In relation to Kosovo the role of television is a good example: a Tirana television station allowed Rugova to make five-minute broadcasts on behalf of the parallel government every day which could be viewed in Kosovo (Judah, 2000:92); and Serb television transmitted the parading of Prince Lazar's remains to millions of Serbs (Sofos, 1999).

\textsuperscript{15} "Bodily hexis is political mythology realized, \textit{em-bodied}, turned into a permanent disposition" (Bourdieu, 1977:93).
It is through processes such as this that "[m]acroevents, or cascades, work their way into highly localized structures of feeling by being drawn into the discourse and narratives of the locality" (Appadurai, 1996:153). Importantly, this approach does not require a primordialist conception of ethnicity. The sentiments that become translated into violence are "structures of feeling, which are both social and historical and are part of the environment within which, gradually, it becomes possible to envisage a neighbor as a fiend" (Appadurai, 1996:153). This is similar to Bourdieu's conception of the evolution of a particular habitus, a particular structure of feeling that is not natural but nevertheless socially extremely powerful. Once this situation or atmosphere has emerged, it becomes possible to see how a shooting in Kosovo becomes an 'ethnic murder'. The examples that can be cited are far too numerous to mention, but the Paracin massacre is a good example. In September 1987 Aziz Kelmendi, an Albanian soldier in the Yugoslav army opened fire in the barracks, killing four soldiers and wounding five others. Regardless what the ‘truth’ surrounding the killings was, whatever his ‘true’ motives, the interpretation of this event was as a "shot against Yugoslavia", which is how it was reported in the Belgrade daily newspapers (Mertus, 1999:145). The Yugoslav army was seen as a pillar of Yugoslavism, its unity and stability16, and Kelmendi’s action became seen as evidence of "the counterrevolution in Kosovo" and "the Albanian menace" (Mertus, 1999:146). It is a good example of the focalization and transvaluation Appadurai mentions, a local event interpreted in much wider terms and acting as a pivotal moment in the conflict. Focalization and transvaluation help explain the transition from enmity to violence, from “schism” to “massacre”, which are analytically similar as “instances of social deconstruction, involving the radical redrawing of social borders along lines more restrictive than those that had previously obtained” (Lincoln, 1998:98). What is important though is the transition to a situation where violence becomes a possible, even necessary option. Lincoln asserts factors such as the transformation of sentiments of estrangement to those of animosity; dehumanization of the other group; and dominance of the state by one of the groups (Lincoln, 1998:99). All of these factors resonate in relation to Kosovo, and the first two link directly to Appadurai’s treachery hypothesis. Appadurai’s "hypothesis of treachery" (Appadurai, 1996:154-155) explains the phenomenon of being able to envisage a neighbour as a fiend, and is linked to group identity in the modern era and to the relationship of violence to treachery, intimacy and identity. "[T]he revelation of hated and hateful official identities behind the bodily masks of real (and known) persons seems crucial to the perpetration of the worst forms of mutilation and damage" (Appadurai, 1996: 155). So the ethnicization of social

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relations in Kosovo as explored on the basis of a Bourdieusian approach seems to have enabled the interpretation of events through an ethnic lens, and had a role in violence being carried out in its name. This helps explain the transition in Kosovo from enmity to war. What is crucial is the role of politicians, religious leaders and the media: this is not to assert a modernist account of ethnicity and assume there is a latent ethnic sentiment awaiting mobilisation by social elites, but to assert that violence on the basis of ethnicity is not a natural phenomenon. There is a certain amount of work that must be done to translate an ethnicized habitus into a situation of hatred and violence. The treachery hypothesis helps explain the brutality of so much of the state-sponsored violence, as well as the perpetuation of violence by civilians or non-state actors. Questions of the politics of affect and transformations in the warrior codes of modern fighters are important. Issues of self-discipline and self-identity are intrinsically bound up with the scale and types of violence exercised in Kosovo: Bourdieusian approaches to the embodiment of experience (Bourdieu, 1977:93) and Ignatieff's analysis of the decline of modern warrior codes that limited and disciplined violence in battle (Ignatieff, 1998) are all relevant here. Whilst it is pertinent to highlight the modernity of so much 'ethnic' violence, in that it is tightly organised from a centre, preceded by a programme of dehumanisation and so on, what needs further exploration is the phenomenon of person on person violence in an era when the legitimate monopoly on the use of force is seen to rest with state, and politics is regarded as a realm that excludes the use of violence. The individual infliction of violence on another person as seen in Kosovo takes place outside of the dominant codes of combat as they have developed in the modern era: non-military people carrying guns, or armed children/youths are symbolically different enemies compared to soldiers of a state army. None of this is untheorized in analyses of 'ethnic conflict' but all too often, it is done is such as way that casts protagonists as recalcitrants of the modern era, or throwbacks to a premodern era. John Mueller (2000) for example, writes about the "banality" of "ethnic conflict", disputing the attribution of violence to ancient ethnic hatreds. However, he reduces conflict to criminality, a breakdown and abandonment of civilised codes of behaviour, without exploring the idea of a transformation in codes rather than a wanton abandoning of them. The idea that violence is committed "to define who can belong" means that distinctions between soldiers and civilians disintegrate, and the untrained irregulars and paramilitaries who committed a large proportion of the violence were not restrained by social bonds to neighbours, or by "professional honor" (Woodward, 1995:237, 239). This may sound similar to Mueller's argument of criminality, but asks for a different explanation of violence, and thus a different response to it.
Much of the violence in Kosovo was perpetrated by non-state actors, and this is where Appadurai’s argument is most helpful, as this is the area of attention where least critical attention has been paid and many analyses do most of their damage, as they end up ascribing premodern, irrational psychologies to people in areas of ‘ethnic conflict’. At the base of murders and kidnappings on an organised or spontaneous basis lies this transition from friend (or neighbour, local shopkeeper and so on) to enemy or traitor. To be revealed as Other, contrary to prior perceptions, is to invite the wrath of the betrayed, and is a more useful way of explaining violence between ordinary people than the thesis of irrationality, ethnic barbarism or criminality. Although ethnic difference may in some cases have functioned as an excuse for criminal activity, it cannot fully account for all non-state violence, and it still requires a structure of perceptions that allows person on person violence. Violence by the KLA against Kosovo Albanians accused of complying with Serbs, and violence against Gorani Kosovars in retaliation for their not being evicted and harassed in the way Kosovo Albanians were are further illuminations of this idea of betrayal.

The symbolic qualities of violence are especially visible when thinking about rape, and destruction of historical monuments and places of religious worship. This type of violence illuminates Campbell’s argument that violence is about the constitution of identities rather than their inevitable clashing. Rape and the discourses surrounding it “sharpened the ethnic border between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians” (Meznaric, 1994:76-77), and rape was a significant point around which tensions in Kosovo grew, regardless of the actual statistics concerning the crime of rape. This is a good example of both Bourdieu and Appadurai’s approaches, as it shows the crystallization of conceptions of social relations around the nodal point of ethnicity. Appadurai’s explanation of the emergence of violent conflict works well with a Bourdieusian approach to the logic of everyday practices. They combine to explain, in a non-essentializing manner, the transformation of social and political relations in Kosovo to a state of being interpreted through ethnicized lenses. This is what the Copenhagen School authors suggest but do not explore fully, and what Campbell fails adequately to account for.

Concluding Remarks

To summarize the main thread of the argument made in this dissertation: the approach of Waever, Buzan et al (the Copenhagen School) has been applied to Kosovo, exploring the concepts of societal security and securitization in relation to the emergence of violent conflict. This approach was chosen because of its attempt at a
reformulation of neorealism, an attempt to capture the dynamics of ‘security’ whilst remaining within the bounds of traditional security studies scholarship. The main problem with their approach as applied to Kosovo is their conception of identity and ethnicity. They accept the petrification of socially constructed identities and freeze historical situations so as to capture the dynamics of the situation, both of which have problematic effects. This is contrasted to the post-structuralist approach taken by David Campbell, which asserts the fluidity and multiplicity of identities. Violence is seen as part of the performative constitution of identity rather than as the expression of a pregiven identity. Whilst Campbell asserts an interpretive approach to the concept of ethnicity, which is a useful alternative to the essentialist approaches of primordialist and instrumentalist analyses, what he underplays is the restriction on identity formation: identities are materialized, and the pool of resources for this is not infinite. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu is a useful addition to both approaches, as it helps account for the ethnicization of political and social life in Kosovo, and fleshes out the basis of the concept of securitization, whilst allowing for Campbell’s claim that identities are continuously being renegotiated and reshaped: they are just being shaped within certain limits. Moreover, these limits are not natural, but the result of historical practices. So one can examine the ethnicization of political and social life in Kosovo from the 1960s, which lays the basis for analysing the emergence of violent conflict in the mid-1990s. This is aided by Appadurai’s formulation of a hypothesis of treachery, which explores how the low-level ethnicization of everyday practice can be transformed into violence in seemingly arbitrary, yet not inexplicable ways. What can be seen is that this reformulated analysis of conflict in Kosovo uses many of the same examples cited in essentialist accounts. What is different is the explanation of these events. Thus the Bourdieusian idea of the transformation from Yugoslavism to ethnic nationalism may at first seem similar to the argument that the death of Tito lifted the lid on bubbling ethnic tensions suppressed under Communist rule. However, the two arguments differ in their explanation of the emergence of ethnic nationalism, and in the strategies they engender. The idea of ‘ethnic conflict’ as the next trend in world politics in the post- Cold War era as a result of the re-emergence of old identities suppressed by Communist rule casts actors involved in the Kosovo conflict as less enlightened than those in the West who respond to such awful events. And the argument that conflict is the result of elite manipulation of ethnic sentiment fails to explore how ethnicity resonated in everyday practices, casting ordinary people as ‘led astray’, and casting states and their leaders as ‘rogues’, to be combated or rehabilitated by the West. These arguments are part of a wider phenomenon whereby Kosovo is discursively constructed as part of ‘the Balkans’: “[t]he Balkans have served
as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and the 'West' has been constructed” (Todorova, 1997:188).

Rather, the task should be to explore the contemporary materialization of ethnic identities at a time when the dominant mode of politics was waning, achieved through processes that drew on historical and traditional resources. The interpretation of events thus changes, as will the strategies drawn up in response. The inadequacy of responses to events in the former Yugoslavia is all too clear. The interpretation and representation of events by the ‘international community’ were part of what supported an exclusivist definition of and response to events in Kosovo. What emerges from this is the inadequacy of liberal approaches to ‘ethnic conflict’, which can only characterise Kosovo as a problematic situation of an ‘ethnic minority’ being in the majority. What is needed is an approach that can explain practices without essentializing identities and othering the protagonists, whilst at the same time not falling into the trap of cultural relativism. Ethnic difference does not in and of itself lead to violent conflict, but if ethnic difference is formulated in exclusivist terms and comes to dominate in political and social life, violent conflict can follow. On the basis of the approaches discussed here, analysts should focus their research on changes in the discursive field, looking for moments of crisis when social meaning is contestable, and for key events when this struggle can be manifested. This, combined with politicians who can read and participate in the field effectively, and material factors such as economic collapse, may well signal the convergence of factors which results in the possibility of the transformation of a situation to one of violent conflict. This work is not an exhaustive account of the emergence of conflict based on the more nuanced approach outlined, but an attempt to think about how conflict in Kosovo might be better analysed.
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